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The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse
Settlements
Keith N. Hylton, Boston University School of Law, and
Sungjoon Cho, Chicago-Kent College of Law
This paper extends the economic literature on settlement and draws some practical
insights on reverse payment settlements. The key contributions follow from the
distinction drawn between standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved,
and injunctive settlements, w and under which reverse settlements will be observed
among injunctive settlements. Reverse settlements are likely when the stakes associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs. The analysis has broader implications for efficient remedies and legal rules. (JEL Kl0, K40,
K41, D24, 034)

1. Introduction
This paper presents an economic analysis of injunctive settlementssettlements that implement the terms of an injunction sought by the

plaintiff. The best-known examples are observed in disputes over the
infringement of property rights, such as nuisance litigation or patent
infringement litigation.
In the patent infringement context, a great deal of controversy today
surrounds "reverse settlements." The reverse settlement involves a
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plaintiff (for example, a pharmaceutical company with a patent on a drug)
paying the defendant (for example, a manufacturer of a generic drug) to
settle the case. The reverse settlement typically includes an agreement to
implement the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff (for example,
that the defendant will restrict sales of the allegedly infringing generic
drug). Reverse settlements are controversial because they involve
settlement payments going in the reverse direction of that observed in
routine litigation.
This paper aims to extend the economic literature on settlement and to
draw some practical insights on reverse settlements. The key contributions
to the economic literature on settlements follow from the distinction drawn
below between standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved,
and injunctive settlements, which prohibit or constrain the defendant's
activity. In many instances, both types of settlement are available to the
parties. Consideration of both types greatly expands the zone of
mutually agreeable settlement arrangements beyond that in traditional
economic analysis of settlements (Landes-Posner-Gould framework).
The analysis identifies the conditions under which injunctive settlements
(rather than standard settlements) are likely to be observed and the
conditions under which reverse settlements will be observed among the
injunctive settlements. Reverse settlements are likely when the stakes
associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation
costs.
The model challenges some of the established stories about the
economics of settlement. The majority of cases settle in this framework
not because the parties have the same beliefs regarding trial outcome, in
addition to similar stakes, but because when the full range of potential
settlement agreements is taken into account litigation is not a rational
outcome in most cases. And when the parties have the same beliefs
regarding trial outcome, settlement will occur no matter how divergent
the stakes.
The analysis here applies to all types of litigation. One result is that the
reverse settlement is part of a family of remedial dispositions that includes
the compensated injunction of Calabresi and Douglas Melamed (1972).
The injunctive settlements studied here could also describe settlements in
which the parties agree to operate under alternative legal rules. Such
settlements could minimize the scope of inefficient legal rules and lead
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to the adoption of private norms in place of the law (Ellickson, 1991).
Widespread adoption of private norms could explain a tendency toward
efficient common law (Rubin, 1977).

2. Model
In this part, we examine the incentives driving parties to litigate and to
settle when the lawsuit seeks both damages and an injunction (injunctive
litigation). The standard economic analysis of litigation examines the
lawsuit for damages (standard litigation). We will refer to the settlement
of injunctive litigation as an injunctive settlement and to the settlement
of standard litigation as a standardsettlement.
Injunctive and reverse settlements can be observed in any area of
litigation in which plaintiffs seek to enjoin some activity of the
defendant. One common example appears in nuisance cases, where the
plaintiff may sue for damages and to enjoin the defendant's nuisancegenerating activity. A settlement could involve the defendant agreeing
to discontinue his activity. Another example is patent infringement
litigation. Since the economic analysis of litigation is familiar,
we will refer to these examples as illustrations throughout this
analysis.
The litigation process is one in which the plaintiff files a complaint,
which is then either settled or prosecuted to a final judgment. The final
judgment enjoins the defendant's activity.
Let Pp be the plaintiff's perception of the probability of winning its
complaint, J the payoff to the plaintiff, and C, the cost to the plaintiff.
Complaints are filed when the net reward from litigation is positive,
PpJp -

Cp > 0, a basic assumption in the economics of litigation

(Shavell, 1982a). The plaintiff's perception of the probability of
winning is determined by his prediction that the court will find that
the defendant has violated the law. In the nuisance setting, that
determination will be based on a balancing test that examines
several economic factors (Hylton, 2008). In the patent infringement
setting, the plaintiff's perception will be determined by his prediction
that the court will find that infringement has occurred, which is both a
function of the patent's validity and the nature of the defendant's
conduct.
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The plaintiff's judgment is made up of two components, the gain the
plaintiff gets from the injunction, Gp, and the damage award D. A
plaintiff will file a claim when the expected net gain from litigation is
positive,
Pp(G,+D)-Cp>0.

(1)

A suit may be filed even though the anticipated damage award is zero,
provided that the plaintiff values the injunction (or the precedent effect)
highly enough. Conversely, a lawsuit may be filed even though the
injunction, or precedent effect, is harmful to the plaintiff, provided the
anticipated damage award is large enough to offset the harm. For
example, a plaintiff might sue to shut down a nuisance-generating
enterprise even though its shuttering actually harms the plaintiff (say,
because he loses his job). Of course, the plaintiff could avoid the loss by
not seeking the injunction. But the plaintiff may prefer to seek the
injunction because of its effect on the settlement value of the case.
2.1. Continued Prosecution of Complaints
The defendant has to worry about the total cost of the lawsuit, which
consists of the cost of an adverse finding and the cost of the process.
Let Pd represent the defendant's prediction of the likelihood of a finding
a violation, Cd the litigation cost borne by the defendant, and Jd the
defendant's assessment of the cost of the judgment. The judgment
consists of the loss to the defendant from the injunction and the damage
award against him: Jd = Ld + D. The total cost of the lawsuit to the

defendant is therefore
Pd (Ld + D) + Cd.

(2)

The total cost of litigation to the defendant may be substantial even if
the anticipated damage award is negligible. In the context of patent
infringement litigation, the cost of the judgment to the defendant
consists of the loss that results from being forced to cede the market
plus the amount the defendant will be required to pay as compensation
to the plaintiff.
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If the expected net gain to the plaintiff from the lawsuit (1) is less than
the defendant's total cost of litigation (2), the parties will settle. Thus,
settlement occurs when
Pp G-PdLd +(Pp-Pd)D < C, +Cd,
(3)
which is the familiar settlement condition of the Landes-Posner-Gould
model modified to take asymmetric stakes into account.' Litigation is
essentially a bet with process costs. The left hand side of Equation (3) is
the ex ante joint expected value of the lawsuit (the bet). The bet is
maintained until the payoff event only if the joint value exceeds the
process costs.
The joint value of the bet consists of two components: the injunction
and the transfer of a fixed sum of money. Think of the injunction as a
token transferred from the defendant to the plaintiff. The expected value
of the token to the plaintiff is equal to his estimate of the probability of
victory multiplied by the value of the token to him. The joint value of
the token transfer game is positive only if the plaintiff's expected value
exceeds the defendant's.
This analysis suggests that the economics of injunctive litigation are
similar to the standard litigation analysis (Landes-Posner-Gould). In the
standard litigation scenario, consistent beliefs (Pp=Pd) implies that all cases
settle, unless the parties have asymmetric stakes.
However, the Landes-Posner-Gould framework is incomplete in this
setting. In spite of the similarity between injunctive and standard
litigation, there are substantial differences between the two. The prospects
for settlement in the injunctive context are not explained entirely by the
Landes-Posner-Gould model because the standard approach does not
incorporate the incentives for a settlement in which the defendant agrees

1. This assumes that the probability of an injunction is the same as the probability of
an award of damages. That may not be valid in all cases. For example, in nuisance
litigation, courts are quicker to provide damages than they are to provide issue an
injunction. If the probabilities of a damage award and an injunction differ, the
settlement condition changes to P'pGp - P'dLd + (Pp - Pd)D < C, + Cd, where P',

and P'd represent the perceptions with respect to an injunction and P, and Pd
represent the perceptions with respect to damages. To keep the model simple, we will
stick with the assumption that the probability of damages is the same as the probability
of an injunction. The results are easily changed for the case in which the probabilities
differ.
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to forgo his preferred option (thus, forfeiting Ld) in order for the plaintiff to
obtain his preferred outcome (obtaining Gp). We consider these types of
settlement below.
2.2. Economics of Injunctive Settlements
The economics of settlement in injunctive litigation are not fully
explained by the traditional Landes-Posner-Gould model because it
ignores settlements that implement the injunction sought by the plaintiff.
For example, in the patent infringement context, a settlement implementing
the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff involves the defendant
exiting the market to let the plaintiff firm sell at the monopoly price.

2.2.1. Settlement incentives: standard versus injunctive
settlements. Recall that the plaintiff sues both to enjoin the defendant's
conduct and to obtain a damage judgment from the defendant. 2 We will
examine the standard settlement in which the defendant pays the plaintiff
money in order to drop his lawsuit and the injunctive settlement that
implements the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff.
Standard settlements. The standard settlement is achieved by the
transfer of money from the defendant to the plaintiff in exchange for the
plaintiff dropping his lawsuit. A standard settlement will be reached under
the Landes-Posner-Gould condition in Equation (3). Since the settlement
payment must exceed the expected net reward to the plaintiff from suing
and since the expected net reward must be positive for the plaintiff to have
a credible claim of suing, the standard settlement will involve a (positive)
payment from the defendant to the plaintiff.
Injunctive settlements. In the injunctive settlement, the defendant
agrees to accept the terms of the injunction sought by the plaintiff. The
settlement results in a cost to the defendant that is equal to the sum of
the settlement transfer and the defendant's loss from the injunction.
Settlement is desirable to the defendant if the total cost of the settlement
to the defendant is less than the total cost of the lawsuit:
S + Ld < Pd(Ld + D) + Cd

(4)

2. One case that we have not examined here is that in which the plaintiff brings a
standard lawsuit for damages, and the parties reach an injunctive settlement. This is an
easy case to examine and at the same time probably unlikely to occur. The additional
complications and expanded space may not be a worthwhile effort.
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Settlement is desirable to the plaintiff if the sum of the transfer and the
gain from the injunction exceed his net payoff from the lawsuit:
S + Gp > Pp (Gp + D)-Cp.

(5)

It follows that the injunctive settlement will be observed if
(1 -Pd)Ld-(1 -Pp)Gp + (Pp-Pd)D < Cp + Cd.

(6)

Injunctive litigation remains equivalent to a bet with process costs,
involving the transfer of a token and fixed sum of money. However, the
joint valuation of the token (the injunction) changes in comparison to
the standard settlement scenario. The reason is that the injunctive
settlement involves a voluntary transfer of the token from defendant to
plaintiff. Given this, the only thing that can happen of relevance in
litigation is for the plaintiff to lose, leaving the token in the defendant's
hands. The joint value of litigation is enhanced by this prospect only if
the defendant's expected gain from having the token awarded to him
exceeds the plaintiff's expected loss.
The individual settlement incentive conditions (4) and (5) imply that the
injunctive settlement, unlike the standard settlement, may require a
negative settlement payment-that is, from plaintiff to defendant. This is
the case of a reverse settlement.
Example 1: Suppose the gain to the plaintiff (G,) is $500 and the loss to
the defendant (Ld) is $200. The cost of litigation is $10 for the plaintiff and
$20 for the defendant. The plaintiff and the defendant both believe that the
probability of plaintiff victory is 75%. The damage award is $10. In order
to accept a settlement, the defendant has to consider whether the cost of
settlement, S + $200, is less than the cost of litigation, (75%)($10) +
(75%)($200) + $20 = $177.50. Since an injunctive settlement will cost
the defendant at least $200, he will prefer litigation unless the plaintiff
pays him at least $22.50 in settlement. Now consider the plaintiff. In
order to prefer the injunctive settlement to litigation, the plaintiff
considers whether the gain from the settlement, S + $500, is greater than
the expected payoff from litigation, (75%)($500) + (75%)($10) - $10 =
$372.50. Since the injunctive settlement guarantees the plaintiff $127.50
more than does litigation, the plaintiff is willing to pay as much as
$127.50 for the settlement. A settlement will be observed involving a
reverse payment between $22.50 and $127.50 from the plaintiff to the
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defendant. The key to the reverse settlement here is that the injunction is so
costly to the defendant, relative to litigation, that he will not agree to it
unless he receives a payment. At the same time, the injunction with
certainty is so valuable to the plaintiff, relative to litigation, that he is
willing to pay for it.
An injunctive settlement can be achieved by the plaintiff sharing his
gain with the defendant, rather than through the transfer of the
settlement payment. Such a settlement would be desirable to the
plaintiff if the share of the gain from the injunction that the plaintiff
retains exceeds his net payoff from the lawsuit-that is, if (1- a)Gp >
Pp(Gp+D)-Cp, where (1-a) is the share retained by the plaintiff. The
settlement would be desirable to the defendant if his net loss in
settlement is less than the total cost of the lawsuit to the defendantthat is, if Ld - aGp < Pd(Ld+D) + Cd.

Example 2: Return to the numerical assumption of Example 1, with a
being the share of the plaintiff's gain offered to the defendant in settlement.
The defendant has to consider whether $200-a($500)<(75%)($l0) +
(75%)($200) + $20, or -a(500) < -22.5. The plaintiff considers whether
(1 -a)($500) > $372.5. If the plaintiff offers the defendant a share of the
gain between .045 and .255, they will settle.
Since the reverse settlement is particularly controversial, it is
worthwhile to examine the conditions under which it will be observed.
Using Equations (4) and (5), the reverse settlement will be observed
when Ld > Pd(D + Ld) + Cd and Gp > Pp(D + Gp) - Cp or, equivalently,
when (l-Pd)Ld > PdD + Cd and (1 -P)Gp > PpD - C,. In less formal

terms:
Observation 1. A reverse (injunctive) settlement will be observed when
the plaintiffs gain from the injunction exceeds his expected net payoff
from the lawsuit and the defendant's loss from the injunction exceeds
3
the expected total cost of the lawsuit to the defendant.
The reverse settlement is determined by the parties' predictions of the
likelihood of plaintiff victory and the size of the stakes (i.e., the plaintiff's
gain and the defendant's loss from the injunction). Reverse settlements are
3. If the probabilities of a damage award and of an injunction differ (see note 1
supra), then the conditions for a reverse settlement change to (1-P')Gp > PD - Cp
and (1-P'd)Ld> PdD + Cd*
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more likely when the parties think the plaintiff's likelihood of victory is
low and when the stakes are high (relative to damages and litigation costs).
The intuition behind the reverse settlement is simple. Assume the
defendant's loss from an injunction is large relative to the damages and
litigation cost. An injunctive settlement requires the defendant to bear
the loss from the injunction with certainty, while litigation involves only
a risk of such a loss. Under these conditions, the defendant will often
demand to be paid in order to accept the injunctive settlement. If he is
not paid, he will prefer to take the gamble of litigation. Similarly, as the
defendant becomes more optimistic (i.e., believes the plaintiff is more
likely to lose), he will demand a payment in order to settle.
Reverse settlements may signal a weak claim on the part of the plaintiff.
However, they may be observed even when the plaintiff has a strong claim
if the stakes associated with the injunction are high. Alternatively, a reverse
settlement may be observed, even though the plaintiff believes he has a
strong case, when the defendant is optimistic about his likelihood of
victory (so must be paid to settle) and the plaintiff's gain from the
injunction is large.4

2.2.2. Comparing Injunctive and Standard Settlements. An
injunctive settlement may be possible under conditions in which a
standard settlement may not be possible and conversely. Consideration of
the two types of settlement enhances the set of potential settlement
agreements.
Intuition would suggest that that the injunction should be awarded to the
plaintiff when the plaintiff's gain from the injunction is greater than the
defendant's loss. This is equivalent to awarding a property right to the
party who values it the most. It follows that a wealth-maximizing
voluntary agreement would reach the same result. That intuition is borne
4. The defendant optimism explanation is emphasized in Schildkraut (2004). One
example that may serve as an illustration of a case where the defendant is optimistic
and the plaintiff's gain from the injunction is large is the trademark dispute between
Microsoft and Lindows (Holman, 2007, 501). Microsoft sued Lindows for trademark
infringement, alleging that the Lindows was confusingly similar to the Windows
trademark. A pretrial ruling permitted the jury to be instructed to consider whether
"windows" was a generic term before Microsoft introduced its operating system
software (Holman, at 502). Rather than risk losing its trademark, Microsoft settled by
making a reverse payment of $20 million to Lindows in exchange for Lindows agreeing
to change its name (to Linspire) (Holman, at 502).
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out in this model. In particular, the injunctive settlement is more likely to
occur than the standard settlement if the gain to the plaintifffrom the
injunction is greater than the loss to the defendant. This is easily
demonstrated: using Equations (3) and (6), an injunctive settlement is
more likely than the standard settlement if
(1-Pd)Ld-(1-Pp)Gp < PpGp-PdLd,

(7)

which holds only when Ld < Gp .
Settlement incentives for injunctive litigation are greater than in the
standard analysis in which the only issue is whether money will be
transferred from the defendant to the plaintiff. Figure 1 shows the
settlement incentive for different combinations of the plaintiff's gain
from the injunction and the defendant's loss from the injunction.
Figure 1 examines the case in which the plaintiff's estimate of the
probability of plaintiff victory exceeds the defendant's estimate of that
probability and the dispute would settle if it were only about monetary
damages. 5 The line SS shows the boundary on standard settlements.
Standard settlements will occur in the shaded space above SS.
Injunctive settlements will occur in the shaded space below IS. Both
types of settlement will be observed for loss-gain combinations in the
intersection of the two shaded areas. Litigation to judgment will occur
in the white pie-shaped region of the diagram.
Incorporation of injunctive settlements in the analysis of litigation
drastically reduces the set of outcomes in which litigation to judgment
occurs. In the standard settlement model, litigation to judgment would be
observed for all of the gain-loss combinations below SS. With injunctive
settlements taken into account, litigation occurs for only a fraction of those
combinations.
Consider the broader implications. The standard analysis of settlement
has led to the general view that the vast majority of cases settle because
5. Specifically, Figure I assumes Pp > Pd and (Pp - Pd)D < C, + Cd. There are two
other parameter configurations to examine: (1) P > Pd and (Pp - Pd)D > C, + Cd; and
(2) P < Pd and (Pp - Pd)D < C, + Cd . The "litigation cone" is larger in these two

alternative diagrams. In the first, the slopes of SS and IS are the same, but their
intersection occurs in the third quadrant. In the second configuration, the SS and IS
curves switch places (in comparison to Figure 2), and the litigation cone covers
the small positive and the negative values of Ld and Gp. The parameter configuration
P,< Pd and (Pp - Pd)D > C + Cd is infeasible.
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Ld =: Gp

Pp > Pd and (Pp - Pd)D < CP+Cd
litigation
injunctive settlements only
standard settlements only
standard and injunctive settlements
Figure 1. Diagram of Litigation and Settlement Areas for Pp > Pd and (Pp

Pd)

D < Cp + Cd.

trial outcome beliefs are similar and litigation stakes are similar.6 But
incorporating injunctive settlements upends that story. In this analysis, if
trial outcome beliefs and stakes are randomly assigned, settlements
should still greatly outnumber the disputes going to litigation. The
6. There is some controversy concerning the measurement of settlements. Eisenberg
and Lanvers (2008) report lower settlement rates than the common 90% estimate and
considerable variation in settlement rates across areas of litigation. The model of this
paper provides an approach to explaining variation in settlement rates across areas of
litigation.

192

American Law and Economics Review V12 Ni 2010 (181-203)

observation that most cases settle does not necessarily imply symmetric
stakes or similar trial outcome beliefs in this analysis.
2.2.3. Consistent beliefs. As we noted earlier, it has been argued that
most legal disputes settle because the plaintiff and the defendant come to
similar predictions of the likelihood of a plaintiff victory in the dispute. For
this reason, we think it is important to examine the incentives for the
different types of settlement in the case of consistent beliefs.
Given consistent beliefs (Pp = Pd = P), the standard settlement condition
is P(Gp - Ld)< Cp +Cd, so that a standard settlement occurs when
Ld > Gp-(Cp + Cd)IP-

(8)

An injunctive settlement will occur when
Ld < Gp +(Cp + Cd)/(1-P).

(9)

These individual settlement conditions imply that some type of
settlement is always feasible under. The general message is as follows.
Proposition 1. Under consistent beliefs, litigation to judgment will not
occur. All disputes will settle, whether stakes are asymmetric or not.
This is not an implication of the Landes-Posner-Gould analysis. In
addition, this ignores strategic interactions and transaction costs, either of
which could generate litigation under the conditions in which this model
predicts that litigation will not occur.
Before considering the detailed implications of Proposition 1, consider
its implications for the literature on settlement and litigation. One view
advanced in the literature is that when beliefs are consistent, litigation
will not occur unless the parties have asymmetric stakes. 7 Deviations
from the Priest and Klein (1984) theorem's 50% win rate prediction are
often explained on this basis.8 The argument runs as follows: when the
trial outcome is least uncertain (not close to 50%), the parties' beliefs
7. This view is obviously supported by the Landes-Posner-Gould condition (3). If
beliefs are consistent, the settlement condition simplifies to: P(Gp -- Ld) < Cp + Cd, and
clearly asymmetry in stakes is necessary for litigation to occur.
8. For an empirical application of the asymmetric stakes theory, see Siegelman and
Waldfogel (1999). An alternative to the asymmetric stakes theory is the asymmetric
information theory explored in Hylton (2006).
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will tend to be consistent most often, so litigation will not occur unless
stakes are asymmetric. To elaborate, let trial outcome beliefs be
generated according to Pd = P + Ed, Pp = P + ep, where Ed and s,
have mean zero (Hylton, 2006).9 Substituting into Equation (3),
settlement occurs when P(Gp - Ld) + pGp - edLd +(ep -ed)D < C

+ Cd. Under the Priest-Klein analysis, when the trial outcome is least
uncertain (i.e., P is not close to 50%), the error variances will be small.
Thus, a significant deviation from the 50% win rate prediction would be
due to the stakes asymmetry, where specifically Gp > LdHowever, the analysis here shows that even if stakes are asymmetric,
all disputes will settle when the parties have consistent beliefs. This
implies that when the full panoply of settlement agreements are taken
into account, deviations from the 50% prediction cannot be explained by
the existence of asymmetric stakes.' 0 To elaborate, if beliefs are generated
according to Pd P+ Ed, Pp = P + ep, then when injunctive settlements
are taken into account, there are two conditions governing settlement:
P(Gp - Ld) + pG - EdLd +(ep ed)D < C, + Cd, and (1-P)(Ld -Gp) +
epGp - 8dLd +(eFp

ed)D < C, + Cd. Stakes asymmetry no longer provides

an explanation, consistent with the Priest-Klein conjecture, for litigation
that results in an average win rate that is different from 50%.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of settlement outcomes under consistent
beliefs. Again, standard settlements occur in the region above SS.
Injunctive settlements occur in the region below IS. Above IS, only
standard settlements will occur. Below SS, only injunctive settlements
occur. In the space between IS and the 45 degree line, both types of
settlement can occur though standard settlements are more likely than
injunctive settlements. The converse holds for the space between SS and
the 45 degree line. It follows that for the consistent beliefs case:
Observation 2. As the probabilityof plaintiffvictory approachesone, the
likelihood of an injunctive settlement increases relative to that of a standard settlement. Conversely, as the probability of victory approaches zero,
9. Given this formulation, the error terms will have to come from a distribution
truncated between one and negative one.
10. Rather than asymmetry in stakes, the explanation for litigation would have to be
based on incomplete ownership or fragmentation of stakes, which is essentially a
transaction cost theory. For further discussion, see the nuisance hypothetical in
Example 3 of the text.
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L

Is

LC= Gp

CdCO

Cd

P)P

Sinjunctive settlements only
standard settlements only
standard and injunctive settlements
Figure 2. Diagram of Litigation and Settlement Areas for Consistent Beliefs Case.

the likelihood of a standard settlement increases relative to that of an
1
injunctive settlement.
Suppose the plaintiff's probability of winning at trial approaches one.
Even if the plaintiff's gain is less than the defendant's loss, the injunctive
settlement may be attractive because it avoids the cost of litigation. The
defendant is almost surely going to lose anyway, and the court will impose
the injunction. It follows then that as the plaintiff's probability of victory
approaches one, the injunctive settlement becomes increasingly attractive
11. In Figure 3, as P approaches one, IS shifts upward, expanding the range of
conditions in which the injunctive settlement is feasible. Similarly, as P approaches
zero, SS shifts downward, expanding the range of conditions in which the standard
settlement is feasible.
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because it avoids litigation costs. A similar litigation-cost-avoidance
argument applies to the case in which the plaintiff's probability of
victory approaches zero.

3. Applications Of Model
The preceding analysis focused on the incentives for injunctive
settlements and contrasting those incentives with the analysis of standard
settlements. Allowing for injunctive settlements expands the range of
potential settlement agreements and explains the observation of reverse
settlements. Here, we discuss applications of the model.
3.1. Nuisance Example: Compensated Injunctions
The general results on injunctive settlements have implications for
several areas of litigation. Consider, for example, a nuisance lawsuit.
Suppose the defendant is a smoke-belching factory and the plaintiff is a
class consisting of homeowners downwind from the factory. A standard
settlement would involve a payment from the factory to the homeowners,
permitting the factory to continue emitting pollution. This was the solution
adopted as a remedy by the court in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 12 An
injunctive settlement would involve the factory abating the pollution,
perhaps by shutting down. In a reverse injunctive settlement, the
homeowners would pay the factory to shut down. This is the remedial
combination first suggested in Calabresi and Douglas Melamed (1972)
and later observed as a court order in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb
Development Co. 13
The results of the previous section imply that the injunctive settlement is
more likely to be observed than the standard settlement when the gain to
the homeowners from the injunction exceeds the loss to the factory. Thus,
if the value of the homeowners' property exceeds the value of the factory
by a substantial amount, the injunctive settlement is likely to be observed.
The reverse settlement (voluntary compensated injunction) is likely to be
observed, based on the analysis of the preceding section (Example 1 and
Observation 1), when the stakes are high relative to the damages suffered
by the homeowners.
12. 257 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1970).
13. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
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Example 3: Suppose the value of the homeowners' property declines
from $10 million to $1 million because of pollution from the defendant's
factory. An injunction would cause the property value to rise back up to the
initial value of $10 million. The gain from the injunction would therefore
be $9 million. Suppose also that the homeowners have suffered some
adverse health effects amounting to $1 million in damages. Assume
consistent beliefs with P = 0.6 and that the cost of litigation for the
plaintiffs is $100,000. On the factory's side, assume the value of the
factory is $5 million and that the factory's cost of litigation is $400,000.
Given these assumptions, the homeowners' payoff from litigation is
(0.6)($1 million) + (0.6)($9 million) - $100,000 = $5.9 million. The
homeowners' gain from the injunction would be $9 million. Hence, the
homeowners would be willing to pay up to $3.1 million for the
injunctive settlement. For the defendant factory, the expected cost from
litigation is (0.6)($1 million + $5 million) + $400,000 = $4 million. An
injunction imposed with certainty will cost the factory $5 million, so it
will demand a payment of $1 million to accept the proposed injunction
rather than continue to litigate. A reverse settlement payment between
$1 million and $3.1 million will be observed. This is consistent with the
model of this paper because the stakes are large relative to the damages
and the litigation costs. The injunctive settlement effectively transfers
the property right over local air quality to the party that places the
greatest value on it.
One interesting difference between the nuisance example and other
instances of litigation is that transaction costs could present an especially
formidable obstacle to the reverse settlement in the nuisance setting.
Suppose, in Example 3, that there are 1000 homeowners affected by the
factory. An injunctive settlement secured through a reverse payment
would require each homeowner to pay a minimum average of $1000.
Some homeowners might hold out on payment, hoping that others would
pick up the difference. This is the familiar problem observed in the
financing of public goods. Since the opposing parties have consistent
beliefs in this example, fragmentation of stakes, not asymmetry in
stakes, is the factor that could drive them into litigation.
The previous example assumes that the injunction in a nuisance dispute
would be issued with the same probability that the court would find the
existence of a nuisance. One lesson of Boomer is that this is not
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necessarily so. When the losses to surrounding property owners are small
relative to the cost of shuttering the factory, a damage payment to the
surrounding property owners may be ordered by the court instead of an
injunction.
If the probability of an injunction differs from that of a finding of a
violation of the law, or if the finding of a violation leads to compensation
rather than an injunction, the incentives governing the injunctive settlement
change. Suppose the probability of an injunction being issued is less than
the probability of the court finding that a nuisance exists. Then the
defendant, aware that his factory is less likely to be shut down, will be
more likely to demand a payment (or a larger payment) in order to
agree to an injunctive settlement. The plaintiff, aware that he is less
likely to get the gain from an injunction through litigation, will be more
likely to pay for an injunctive settlement. To illustrate, suppose in
Example 3 that the likelihood of a finding of a nuisance is 0.6 and the
likelihood of an injunction being issued is 0.4, then the homeowners'
payoff from litigation would be (0.6)($1 million) + (0.4)($9 million) $100,000 = $4 million, which implies that homeowners would be
willing to spend up to $5 million for the injunctive settlement. For the
factory, the expected cost from litigation would be (0.6)($1 million) +
(0.4)($5 million) + $400,000 = $3 million, which implies that the
factory would need to receive $2 million in order to shut down voluntarily.
If the court provides compensation to the plaintiff rather than an
injunction, the implications for a reverse injunctive settlement change
significantly. When compensation based on the economic loss of the
plaintiffs will be required, the conditions for a reverse settlement become
GP > Pp(D + #Gp) - C, for the plaintiff and Ld> Pd(D + #G,) + Cd for the
defendant, where 0 is the percentage of the plaintiffs' economic value loss
compensated. When the defendant evaluates the cost of litigation, he now
considers the compensation payment based on the plaintiffs' value loss
rather than the cost of the injunction to him. When the economic value
loss is large relative to the factory value, the factory owner may prefer
the injunctive settlement to litigation and may be willing to provide a
payment to plaintiffs to avoid litigation. If, on the other hand, the
factory value is large relative to the plaintiffs' economic value loss (or
the compensation ratio is small), then this becomes similar to the case
where the probability of the injunction is less than the probability of a
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nuisance finding. As the compensation ratio declines, the factory owner
demands a larger payment and the homeowners are more willing to
pay it. To illustrate, return to the assumptions of Example 3 and let
the compensation ratio (fl) be 80%. The plaintiff homeowners' payoff
from litigation would be (0.6)($1 million) + (0.6)(0.8)($9 million) $100,000 = $4.82 million, which implies that homeowners would be
willing to spend up to $4.18 million for the injunction. For the
factory, the cost from litigation would be (0.6)($1 million) + (0.6)(0.8)
($9 million) + $400,000 = $5.32 million. This implies that the factory
will demand a payment to shut down only if the factory's value exceeds
$5.32 million. If the factory's value is less than $5.32 million, it will
prefer the injunctive settlement (shutting down) rather than continuing
to litigate in the face of the risk of a large damage payment based on
the plaintiffs' loss.
The structure of the nuisance problem considered here applies to many
disputes. Consider the "fencing out" versus "fencing in" problem
(Ellickson, 1991). Two neighbors own adjacent parcels. One owns cattle
that roam about and damage the property of his neighbor. If the victim
of the damage sues the cattle owner, he may seek an injunction that
would effectively force the cattle owner to fence in his animals. Instead
of seeking a settlement for money that preserves the status quo, the
plaintiff could ask for an injunctive settlement. If the victim's property
value is large relative to the value the cattle owner places on the
animals' freedom to roam about, a reverse settlement may be observed.
3.2. Patent Infringement
The settlement model of this paper can be modified to take into account
the considerations in patent infringement litigation. Patent infringement
litigation can be distinguished from nuisance litigation in several ways.
Most importantly, it is believed that there is a dynamic efficiency cost
associated with patent infringement. If patents are infringed easily with
no punishment to infringers, innovators will have weak incentives to
invent new products and processes.
We will assume that there is a potential dynamic incentive cost resulting
from the rejection of the plaintiff's infringement claim. Let the social cost
of the dynamic incentive effect be F. The portion of the social cost borne
by the plaintiff will be represented by y P.
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In the infringement setting, the gain to the plaintiff Gp represents the
value to the plaintiff of the defendant's decision to discontinue the
allegedly infringing activity. The loss to the defendant Ld represents the
profits forgone by the defendant's decision to discontinue the activity.
The injunctive settlement will be desirable to the infringement
plaintiff if
S+Gp > Pp(Gp+D)-Cp-(1-Pp,y4

(10)

where the last term reflects the plaintiff's perception of the dynamic incentive cost of losing his patent monopoly. The condition determining whether
the injunctive settlement is desirable to the defendant is the same as in the
basic model:
S +Ld < Pd(Ld +D) +Cd.

(11)

An injunctive settlement will observed when
(1 -Pd)Ld-l 1-Pp) Gp + (Pp-Pd)D-(1 -Pp) yT < Cp + Cd

(12)

The likelihood of an injunctive settlement is greater than in the previous
analysis because the plaintiff is willing to pay more in order to avoid the
dynamic efficiency cost.
The dynamic efficiency concern is expressed in connection with
infringement of intellectual property rights in general-with respect to
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. The framework set out
here applies to injunctive settlements in all of these areas. The economic
analysis of the incentives for injunctive settlements, and for reverse
settlements, does not differ substantially from what we have discussed
earlier.
However, one important distinguishing characteristic of infringement
litigation is the divergence between private and social incentives to settle
(Shavell, 1982b). An injunctive settlement denies consumers the surplus
that would be generated by the market entry of the alleged infringer
(Shapiro, 2003). This is an element of social welfare that is not taken
into account in the conditions governing the private incentives for
settlement, shown in Equations (10) and (11). As a result, the private
incentive for an injunctive settlement may be greater (or less) than the
social incentive. Indeed, if W is the additional consumer welfare
generated by the entry of the alleged infringer and P is treated as the
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objective probability of infringement, an injunctive settlement will be
socially desirable if and only if
(1 -P) (W +Ld) <

Cp +

d+ (1-P)'P

(13)

This means that the social gain from litigation, which is the value of the
additional surplus and the gain to the defendant infringer, is less than the
sum of the litigation costs and the expected social cost of permitting
infringement.
Example 4: Suppose the value of the plaintiff's patent on an invention
declines from $100 million to $20 million because of the defendant's
infringement. An injunction would cause the value of the patent to
increase to $80 million, the discount from 100 reflecting the shorter
remaining time on the patent grant. The gain to the plaintiff patentee
from the injunction would therefore be $60 million. Suppose also that
the patentee has lost market share as a result of the infringement,
resulting in $10 million in damages. Beliefs are consistent with P = 0.6.
The cost of litigation for the plaintiff patentee is $1 million. On the
defendant's side, assume the value of the infringing business $30 million
and that the cost of litigation for the alleged infringer is $4 million. Given
these assumptions, the patentee's expected award from litigation is
(0.6)($10 million) + (0.6)($60 million) = $42 million. However, if the
patentee loses the litigation, his future incentives to invent, in connection
with the existing patent or for new products, will be diminished as will be
those of similar firms. Suppose the cost of that diminishment in incentives
is $10 million and the portion borne by the patentee alone is $5 million, the
expected cost to the patentee will therefore be (0.4)($5 million) = $2
million. Given all of this, the patentee's expected payoff from litigation
is $42 million - $2 million - $1 million = $39 million. The patentee's
gain from the injunction would be $60 million. Hence, the patentee
would be willing to pay up to $21 million for the injunctive settlement.
For the defendant firm, the expected cost from litigation is (0.6)($10
million + $30 million) + $4 million = $28 million. An injunction with
certainty will cost the alleged infringer $30 million, so it will demand a
payment of $2 million to accept the proposed injunction rather than
continue to litigate. A reverse settlement payment between $2 million
and $21 million will be observed. The settlement, however, will not be
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socially desirable. Suppose the loss in consumer welfare from the exclusion
of the alleged infringer is only $1 million. The social benefit from
continued litigation would be equal to (0.4)($30 million + $1 million) =
$12.4 million. The social cost of this patent litigation would be $1
million + $4 million + (0.4)($10 million) = $9 million. Society would be
better off if the parties were not permitted to settle the dispute.
The problems illustrated here, and especially the divergence between
private and social incentives to settle, are observed more generally in all
types of competition-blocking litigation. Intellectual property infringement
cases all fall within this category and so do administrative proceedings
associated with efforts to block competition, such as antidumping
proceedings (Cho, 2009).
3.3. Waivers
In addition to the settlement option, an injunctive settlement could be
incorporated into negotiations over a predispute waiver agreement. In
other words, before any event occurs that might lead to a lawsuit, the
potential plaintiff could approach the potential defendant and negotiate
an agreement in which he promises never to sue in exchange for the
potential defendant's agreement to forgo the activity that might generate
a lawsuit from the potential plaintiff. For example, a patentee could
approach a firm that might potentially infringe on its patent and enter
into an agreement in which the patentee promises not to sue for
infringement and the firm agrees to forgo any future activity that the
patentee alleges is an infringement. This type of injunctive waiver would
be an alternative to the standardwaiver, which involves just an agreement
by the potential plaintiff to forgo his right to sue.
In the standard litigation framework, private and social incentives to sue
diverge because of the costliness of litigation (Shavell, 1982b). In a low
transaction cost setting, the standard waiver provides a Coasean solution
to the inefficient litigation that arises because of this divergence (Hylton,
2000). Whenever the deterrence benefits from litigation are less than the
expected litigation costs, standard waivers will be exchanged between
potential plaintiffs and potential defendants. However, the standard
waiver merely eliminates the risk of inefficient litigation. The waiving
party still bears the losses caused by the potential defendant's activity.
The injunctive waiver can increase social welfare by relieving the
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waiving party of those losses when the waiving party attaches a greater
value to the injunction than does the potential defendant.
3.4. Some General Implications
The model here has implications for the generation of efficient norms.
Where the stakes attached to legal rules are high relative to the damages in
litigation, the parties may adopt settlement agreements that reverse the law.
Agreements of the sort examined in Ellickson (1991), sometimes reversing
the law, are likely to be observed. Indeed, the parties may adopt litigation
waiver agreements that reverse the law as between themselves.
Rubin (1977) focused on litigation as a primary force pushing the law
toward efficient rules. Where the stakes are high, parties will challenge
inefficient legal rules in court more often than efficient rules. This
paper's model suggests that settlement and waiver agreements will have
the same effect. Rather than challenge inefficient rules until they are
overturned in court, this model shows that parties will sometimes have
incentives to enter into settlement agreements that reverse the legal rule
as between them. This suggests a stronger push toward common law
efficiency than implied in Rubin's analysis.

4. Conclusions
This paper extends the economic analysis of settlements and draws some
practical implications for injunctive and reverse settlements. It identifies the
conditions under which injunctive settlements are likely to be observed and
the conditions under which reverse settlements will be observed among the
injunctive settlements. The design space for settlements is considerably
broader than in the traditional analysis; settlements are more likely to
occur than acknowledged in the standard model. Settlements may
effectively reverse the law as between the litigants. Asymmetric stakes are
not sufficient to stop settlements from occurring.
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